This paper examines India's experiences as the only non-self-governing member of the League of Nations as a means of addressing the broader question: where was the international? As the only non-self-governing member of the League, India's new international status exposed both its external, more imperial, as well as its internal, more colonial, anomalies. This paper examines, first, the Indian anomaly from the 'inside out', looking at India's representation and silencing at Geneva, and how Indian commentators assessed India's external status in the League. Secondly, it considers the Indian anomaly from the 'outside in', by exploring colonial tensions that the internationalism of the League provoked relating to India's internal political geography. The League posed taxing questions about the Government of India's decision to exclude international law from the spaces between British and Princely India, examined here through the example of trafficking in women and children. In exploring India's anomalous situation two broader approaches are deployed. The first is a scalar methodology, which shows how the concepts of the national and international operated at various scales, with India's burgeoning sense of nationhood taking one of its many shapes in the international sphere, while the internationalism of the League seeped into the national fissures between British and Princely India. Secondly, the paper approaches these questions through the lens of sovereignty. Moving beyond associations with the juridical and the territorial, it explores sovereignty as: representational (diplomacy); governmental (administration), theoretical (political philosophy), political (anti-colonialism), territorial (political geography) and contractual (international law).
and the territorial this paper tracks the fundamentally geographical and historical question: where was the international? 3 The paper will proceed in two parts. The first looks at India 'inside out', examining its representation abroad and the debates within India about its external position, in terms of internationalism and India's 'imperial' status. This is the scale at which India's anomalous nature has been mostly commented upon, 4 but it is also the scale at which most League members could claim to be anomalous, given the newness of the League experiment and the ruptured imperial and nation-state system across which it was attempting the 'organisation of peace'. 5 The second section examines the subcontinent from the 'outside in', charting a lesser known Indian anomaly, which raised more 'colonial' questions about territory and the indirect rule of India's Princely States (as opposed to directly ruled British India). The League's activities provoked tensions between these two sovereign regimes, which will here be examined through the lens of trafficking in women and children (TWC). Trafficking was an international concern which emerged in the interwar period, especially through the activities of the League, 6 augmenting previous concerns about the white slave trade, and prostitutioneregulation policies which focused on the health of colonial elites, 7 with a concern for mobility, rights and human dignity. 8 In late-colonial India this development was clearly part of a broader and ongoing negotiation of imperialism, gender and sexuality. 9 But trafficking also fitted into the 'social and technical' section of the League's duties, which saw it move beyond peacekeeping and international law to investigate economics, epidemics, refugees, arms and opium trafficking. 10 The League could only concern itself with the international elements of these topics, but in this respect TWC is of special interest to the geographer. 11 This sort of trafficking did not entail large shipments or bulky goods; a girl or woman, often seemingly willing, could be easily concealed, or openly flaunted. 12 But, most importantly, there was evidence of 'trafficking' in India, but it was 'regional' trafficking between states of the Indian Empire. So defined, it was beyond the a League of Nations' purview, but a 1933 draft of a League convention questioned this territorial definition of sovereignty by redefining the relationship between 'protectorates', 'suzerainties' and 'colonies'.
As such, TWC brought issues of internationalist concern into the cracks and fissures between politically sovereign domestic units, as the case of the indirectly ruled Princely States in India will highlight. Trafficking in women and children will, therefore, allow us to consider India's specifically anomalous status within the League of Nations but, in so doing, will also provide insight into the aforementioned concepts which have been explored, at great length, by geographers and others, namely: sovereignty; imperialism; and internationalism.
Sovereignty, imperialism, internationalism and India
There has also been an. extensive rethinking of imperial power and where we might look for it. The battle for empire has seen military and economic might challenged by the power of discourse, identity, and representation, then by disciplinary power, biopolitics, and embodiment, and, latterly, by increased attention to sovereignty.
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The abstract notion of sovereignty as the ultimate authority over a political community requires constant tailoring to its geographies, exploring how state sovereignty is changing and how new spatialities of power negotiate 'the push and pull of centripetal globalizing forces and centrifugal forces of regionalism, separatism and nationalism'.
14 Historical debates about the nature of sovereignty, whether dependent on supreme command (constituted) or liberal, democratic authority (constituent), also require tailoring to context, including that of the colonial. 15 Colonial sovereignties were hybrid and frequently violated, 16 while the domination at their core could be exposed by the politics of anti-colonial nationalism. 17 This made it clear that sovereignty is also exerted over bodies, symbols, money, and representations. 18 Recent approaches to sovereignty have moved beyond the readings of political philosophy and jurisprudence to engage with geopolitics, discourse analysis, performativity, embodiment and power. 19 At a theoretical level, Foucault's call to examine governmentalities that triangulate disciplinary and governmental power with sovereign powers still demands attention.
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One productive frame for approaching these provocations is to think of 'sovereignty regimes' as combinations of central state authority and political territoriality. 21 This focus on effective sovereignty draws attention to authorities from both within and beyond strict territorial state limits: 'sovereigntydin the sense of the socially constructed practices of political authoritydmay be exercised nonterritorially or in scattered pockets connected by flows across spacespanning networks'. 22 This paper examines the Government of India's grappling with sovereignty regimes that were imagined to be below (the Princely States) and above (the League of Nations) its domain of scalar sovereignty. 23 The following cases will highlight some of these many types of sovereignty (and their forms), namely: representational (diplomacy); governmental (administration); theoretical (political philosophy); political (anti-colonialism); territorial (political geography); and contractual (international law). 24 These types and forms constituted the 'imperialist' sovereignty regime that Agnew has identified, and which is a defining feature of current postcolonial work on empires. 25 Empires are currently being re-imagined, through postcolonial and new imperial histories, 26 as sovereign regimes with multiple and overlapping scales and networks of authority. 27 These span divisions between formal and informal empires, imperial metropole and colonial periphery, and norms and exceptions. 28 The complex geographies of these experimental sovereignty regimes have been mapped by Benton's magisterial survey of imperial experiments with international law between 1400 and 1900. 29 She
showed how imperial sovereignty expanded through corridors and estuaries, negotiated hills and mountains, strung together islands of martial experimentation, and incorporated enclaves of quasisovereignty. 30 Benton's examples of the latter are the Princely
States that feature later in this paper, where her work will be explored in greater depth. Nair has recently suggested that the region might be the necessary scale at which to rethink Princely modernity in India but it might also be a vital scale for thinking the international within national borders. 31 This study of the interwar period extends Benton's temporal scope to a period when imperial sovereignty, federalism, and the ever-expanding networks of globalisation were being debated. These debates took place within a post-First World War enthusiasm for internationalism, the emergent phenomenon marked by increasingly dense diplomatic encounters, the growth of international institutions and international law, and the re-negotiation of state sovereignty. 32 In addition to shifts in practice, internationalism was also a utopian aspiration that anticipated a more benign form of cooperation between cohabitating (rather than competing) states. As against imperialism and nationalism, the internationalist ethic marked itself out by proposing an alternative vehicle of civilised development. 33 Yet E.H. Carr famously argued that such utopian liberalism ignored the geopolitical realities of imperialism, exploitation, and state formation in the interwar period. 34 Others demonstrated that the proposed international system was based around an idea of European civilisation, thus reconstituting the nomos of nineteenth-century international law but in a way which allowed America to supplant Europe as global sovereign. 35 As the primary institutional manifestation of the internationalist utopian spirit, all of the above criticisms of internationalism were laid at the League of Nations' door. The configuration of these criticisms very much depended upon the national context from which they came. Latin American countries constituted a third of the League's member states but railed against the lack of interest displayed by what quickly came to be seen as a European organisation. 36 In the heart of Europe, however, others described the League as an occupying force, colonising the defeated powers of the First World War under the banner of a triumphant internationalism. 37 Eric Manela has shown how initial enthusiasm for Wilson's concept of 'self-determination' in China, Korea, Egypt and India quickly failed as the racial delimitations of this term came to be understood. 38 But India's engagement with the League, and it's criticisms, outlasted the period of Manela's interest, and that of his other case studies, due to India's position as a non-self-governing, increasingly anti-colonial, member of the League. But India's League of Nations membership did not mark the beginning of its international biography; it followed, and depended upon, an already growing international status. Pre-colonial India had been at the heart of trading and diplomatic networks across the Indian Ocean arena, while it continued to dominate this region as a British imperial sub-pole in terms of expertise and influence and through territorial protectorates and residencies. 39 India had started to attend meetings of experts on technical or scientific subjects, organised by international bureaux including the Postal and Telegraph Unions or the Office of Public Health at Paris. A major step towards political recognition was taken when it was admitted to the Councils of Empire along with the self-governing Dominions, 40 responding to pressure from Indian campaigning groups since the 1880s. 41 As a result, India attended the 1917 Imperial
Conference and the Imperial War Cabinet of 1918, which paved the way for its attendance at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. 42 It was this forum that catapulted India into international consciousness as a diplomatic unit, just as its nationalist movements were becoming increasingly internationalist in their campaigns. 43 While India's nationalist emergence has garnered endless attention, its interwar international identity remains less well studied. In part this is because India's position in Geneva has been viewed as a curio or novelty, and most undeniably as an anomaly. But this also reflects the failure to study the intersection of imperialism and internationalism more broadly. While there is a growing literature on the League's mandated territories, 44 the League also intersected with imperial geographies in nonmandated spaces. Zanasi, for instance, has suggested that the League attempted to take over the colonial 'civilising mission' framework in its attempt to aid China's interwar development, but was struck by indecision over lingering evolutionary narratives, the possibility of exporting modernity, and the exigencies of local implementation. 45 Hell has also shown how the Kingdom of
Siam, the only territory in Southeast Asia never to have been formally colonised, became a founding member of the League and used this status to bargain for full sovereignty and greater economic autonomy from the French and British empires which surrounded it. 46 Other interpretations have seen the League as a foil for American economic imperialism, often in the guise of humanitarianism; as raising the prospect of a global Monroe Doctrine; or as being so heavily complicit with empires that it risked contaminating the United Nations with its pro-imperialism. 47 When dealing with European empires the League often came up against the stubborn obstinacy of colonial governors inimical to the cost (political or economic) of change. 48 But beyond these private debates, the unevenness of India's anomalous position was also obvious in public, and was commented on precisely in the representational terminology of silencing. The markers of its diplomatic subordination were clear; India was permanently relegated to the lower ranks of the League (despite the Aga Khan taking up Presidency of the League Assembly in 1937), 69 never taking a seat in the Council, despite vastly overshadowing other nations which had enjoyed such a privilege in terms of population, wealth and geographical size. 72 This referred to the 1899 painting of a dog listening to a gramophone, raising parallels not only with a speechless subaltern, but a more animalistic colonial subject/servant ( Fig. 1) . 73 Pant went on to denounce the voice heard at Geneva as being no more genuine than that of the American film 'India Speaks', a 1933 film also titled 'Bride of the East' that claimed to provide a travelogue of sexual habits in India, alleging the abuse and over sexualisation of Indian women and children (Fig. 2 ). An accompanying book was also produced featuring stills from the film with accompanying captions decrying Indian poverty, backwardness and immorality. 74 The silencing metaphor was deployed again in the Assembly in 1937 by Bhagwan Das 75 who suggested Indian representatives were but the nominated tools, mouthpieces, megaphones and microphones of the British Government. 76 These accusations of silencing formed part of a growing cacophony of dissent against India's silenced role in the League, and of the League's benefits for India.
Criticising the League: from political philosophy to anti-colonial nationalism
Even those who defended the League in Britain, and who saw it as of great benefit for India, were aware of its limitations and inequalities. Professor C.A.W. Manning agreed that India paid more than any other non-member of the permanent council for relatively little direct benefit, and questioned how representative India's League representatives were. 77 But he also stressed how various League initiatives were of benefit to the country, and how its contributions in the League Assembly regarding India, Asia, and the members in general, were fortifying its international reputation.
There is a general consensus that India's League membership worked to dispel world opinions regarding its backwardness, granted it similar diplomatic status to the Dominions, and framed its nationalist movement in interesting ways. 78 The first major post-independence review of India and the League went so far as to suggest that India was thrust back into world politics, regaining its pre-colonial international status.
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But debate over the League of Nations took place across the spectrum of Indian political opinion. Moderate commentators launched their critiques and defences in terms of theoretical state sovereignty. The League was a specifically internationalist body and could not intervene, in the terms of political philosophy, in 'domestic' issues. Despite the tradition of this domesticity being continually impinged upon by imperial states outside Europe, Western states could now appeal to the Westphalian concept of territorial integrity and exclusive sovereign autonomy to prevent League intervention into their metropolitan and peripheral possessions. 80 But when these arguments were extended to India, they raised the very question of India's ontological sovereign status. Sir J. C. Coyajee's pro-League commentary argued that a state's sovereignty was fundamentally unaltered by League membership, which supplemented rather than detracted from state sovereignty. 81 However, others argued that colonial India did not even constitute a sovereign nation-state in terms of international law: it was not internationally recognised as independent; it was not selfgoverning; it had been committed to war by another state; it could The contradictions of India's anomalous membership were widely commented upon at the time. Had India applied for membership of the League it would have been rejected as a non-selfgoverning state; its membership relied solely on having signed 82 Verma, India and the League of Nations (note 54), 29 . 83 Verma, India and the League of Nations (note 54), 31. the Versailles treaty. The terms used to describe this predicament altered, but the contradiction at the heart of India's status did not. Hall and Sen acknowledged India's status as the only one of the 56 member states of the League not to be self-governing, but argued that in international matters India was self-governing, and that the League could not help nations on the path to democratic government. 84 Ram and Sharma were less ambiguous: 'It is surely a curious phenomenon that a country should have the right to direct, conjointly with others, the common affairs of 54 countries, without the right to govern herself. Looked at from this point of view, India is a political curiosity inside the League'. 85 Even Coyajee admitted that India's status was anomalous, but insisted that dominions had similar problems.
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As these comments make clear, the supposed benefits brought to India by its membership were far from universally appreciated by Indians themselves. This was in spite of initial enthusiasm not just from political commentators, but from anti-colonial nationalists as well. During the Versailles debates the nationalist politician Bal Gangadhar Tilak wrote to Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, posing India as a self-contained yet vast, and potentially powerful, state on the international plane. 87 Manela has pursued the other ways in which India attempted to use the diplomatic sphere to assert its growing sense of national entitlement in synch with broader networks of international anti-colonialism. Wilson's call for self-determinism was taken up as a political principle by nationalisms that challenged imperialisms and as a practice in asserting the case for independence, though these were largely ineffective. 88 India's massive contribution to the war (estimated to be 1,200,000 men) led to great expectations of reward, and enthusiasm for Wilson. His principles had been taken up in 1917 in India, and had been circulated by the Irish theosophist and Indian nationalist Annie Besant; Wilson was also petitioned by the Ghadr revolutionary party, the more moderate Lala Lajpat Rai, and the later Comintern Presidium member M.N. Roy. 89 After the war the Indian National Congress and Muslim League took up the call for self-determination, despite their disappointment at the British selection of Indian delegates at Geneva. When it became clear that post-war constitutional reform in India would disappoint common expectations, the nationalist press turned against Wilson. The 'Golden Peacock's Diary' in the New Burma newspaper on 29th May 1920 suggested that self-determination was not just for white nations (as Ireland was also denied) but for old nations. But the denying of this right to Egypt, Ireland and India had exposed self-determination as 'a huge international sham'. 90 For Congress leader M.K. Gandhi, the Khilafat movement (a pan-Islamist protest at the Allied treatment of the Ottoman Empire after the war) had exposed the League not only as capitalist but as Christian, in its denial of self-determination to Ottoman Muslims. 91 Congress's Rowlatt satyagraha in 1919, followed by the non-cooperation movement, appealed to Indian tradition, in clear rejection of claims to international order or civilisation.
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While Manela's investigations were focused on Wilson and the debates over Versailles, the League attracted ongoing comment in India where, in general, its popularity declined. When the Legislative Assembly was allowed to discuss the League in 1923 it recorded anger at the treatment of Indian labourers in ex-German mandates, while further questions were raised about the size of India's contribution and its lack of democratic representation in Geneva. 93 In 1924 the assessment by a Professor of Economics at the University of Bombay of the 1919 Government of India Act casually decried the League for its lack of policing powers, and its foundation on consent and compliance: 'To the enthusiastic idealist, the League may appear as the embryo of the future, full-grown "Parliament of Man": but judged from its actual history of four years' existence, the League is still only e a pious aspiration'. 94 The former President of the Indian National Congress, C. Vijiaraghavachariar, outlined a more aggressive vision of the possibilities of the League. 95 He quoted the political theorist of politics and sovereignty Harold Laski's assertion that India must be allowed to appeal to the League as a representation of 'the common will of the world'. 96 This would help, in Vijiaraghavachariar's view, discipline the Indian population, who had proven themselves unready for the challenge of non-cooperation in the early 1920s. The logic was that India had a right to call on the League regarding any threat to world peace, but that its delegates would not do this as they were selected by the British government. It was necessary to take on Britain 'in any sphere'. The League presented a forum in which to challenge the government on, for instance, its 'anti-national financial policy' or its treatment of minorities. Indian criticisms also targeted the activities of the League on the world stage. Ram and Sharma listed the League's failure to effectively enforce disarmament, to include the USSR, USA, Afghanistan and Brazil in its membership, to encourage the selfgovernment of 'dependencies' or the independence of mandates, or to grant seats on the Council to African, Australian, American or Asian nations, besides China. 97 In broader terms it was criticised as an institution that excelled in advising but not in actually dealing with crises. For Jawaharlal Nehru, the League's noble principles had been squandered, leaving it as little more than a tool of imperialism for the Great Powers. 98 and commercial benefits from its membership. 100 In surveying similar critical literature Verma also noted the more positive commentary in India on the League's work on labour, intellectual cooperation and anti-trafficking. 101 Regarding the latter, clause 23c of the League Covenant was honoured with the first meeting of the Advisory Committee for Trafficking in Women and Children in 1922. 102 It worked through conventions and publications to encourage legislation and policies to reduce enforced prostitution and international trafficking. 103 As has been demonstrated at length regarding League enquiries into trafficking in women and children, the Government of India constantly invoked the 'domestic' to defend itself from League enquiries. 104 But the division between Princely and British Indian
States within the Indian Empire provoked a much more complex dilemma over territory and sovereignty than that of the domestic/ international debate.
Outside in: internal political geographies and international trafficking
As an international anomaly, India reformulated Britain's imperial sovereignty regime through debates about representation (diplomatic silencing), government (administering internationalism), theory (political philosophies of statehood) and politics (anticolonialism). The internal anomaly of the Princely States, and the problems raised by trafficking in women and children, raised similar sovereign dilemmas within the scale of the subcontinent, but in very different forms. Territorial questions of sovereignty emerged regarding India's regional political geographies, to which theories of quasi-sovereignty and unfettered paramountcy were proffered in response. Mundane governmental sovereignties of administrative indirect rule of the Princely States were threatened by theoretical possibilities opened up by League membership, which provoked constitutional dilemmas, representational clashes between the Viceroy and the Chamber of Princes, and a crisis of contractual sovereignty as the implications of India's commitments in international law to tackle trafficking in women and children became clear.
India's princely geographies
While the diplomatic status of India was a complex and vexed one for the League of Nations, so was the question of India's geography that the League's legal conventions and probing questions regarding the trafficking in women and children committee provoked. This geography was an internal one of territory and quasisovereignty, but one that the League threw into a new light. 'India' was a founding member of the League, but it was also part of the British Empire, although it was an Empire within the Empire, rather than a colony. Within the subcontinent, 'India' was divided into British India and the Princely States (of which there were 562 in 1929) 105 while British India was divided into three Presidencies (Bengal, Bombay and Madras) and subdivided into Provinces (Fig. 3) . Thus, when each member of the League was asked to appoint a coordinating authority for trafficking in women and children policy, 'India' returned four, one for each of the three Presidencies plus Burma, while after partial devolution under the dyarchy system in 1919 it was the provinces who would legislate on trafficking and prostitution. 106 The Princely States were territories unconquered at the time of the Government of India Act of 1858 who were guaranteed their continued existence by Queen Victoria's pledge of the same year. 107 Yet, the States had to accept British residents at court, the regulation of succession and control of their foreign affairs, as had been the case since the 1820s. 108 Their independence was further intruded upon by legal reworkings of BritisheIndian state relations in the 1870se90s that increased British powers of intervention. But the Princely States also created regional spaces for experiments with modernisation that could be less constrained than in the politically sensitive British Indian States. 109 These experiments took place within the 'quasi-sovereignty' of the Princely States as defined by 'imperial law'. 110 Benton has shown how the theoretical concept of quasisovereignty was invented by the mid-to late-nineteenth-century international legal community in an attempt to classify dependent imperial sub-polities that were technically outside the scope of international law. 111 These attempts included analogy (empires as international orders or legal hegemonies) or description (ranking polities from federalisms to coalitions of near independent states). On the latter scale the Princely States were somewhere in the middle, but analogically it was stressed that the British had theoretically unlimited power over the Princes. Such thinking was justified by the principle of divisible sovereignty. Sir Henry Maine, a law member of the Viceroy of India's council, claimed in 1887 that sovereignty was an assemblage of separate powers, including those regarding peace or war, justice, and law making. 112 To possess all of them indicated an independent sovereign, but they could be divided, as was the case in the Princely States, and in the imperial policy of indirect rule more generally. 113 Yet this left the problem of how to encourage 'development', and to exert control, in these spaces. Sir Charles Lewis Tupper, drawing on Maine, argued in the 1890s that the Princely States should be exempt from international law and be governed by officially determined law (that is 'political' not 'diplomatic' law) based upon the doctrines of divisible sovereignty and usage. But this determination would be relating to decisions based on British precedent, not on general rules. This established, as Benton put it, 'indeterminacy as policy'. 114 While Benton's studies conclude in 1900, this policy was very much taken forward into the Prince's almostinternational life in the interwar period.
The governmental sovereignty of the Princely States was eroded through controls over trade, commerce and communication, although these interventions were reined in during 1909e10 in an attempt to guarantee Princely support against the emergent nationalist movement. 115 This 'laissez faire' period was undermined in 1926 when Viceroy Reading's campaign to reclaim British supremacy over the Princes culminated in an open letter declaring that the sovereignty of the British Crown in India was supreme, and that it had the right to intervene in the Princely States due to its conditions of 'unfettered paramountcy'. 116 The League of Nations threw into question, however, the nature of this paramountcy, even though the term had itself been negotiated and included at This disagreement summarised the main problem that was debated for the following two years in extensive internal dialogue across the departments of government, often in reaction to prompts issued by the Secretary of State in London. Each Department was asked to comment upon the international conventions which affected it, and whether they had made efforts to encourage the Princely States to adopt similar measures. The replies proved a complete lack of common policy regarding the Indian States, and a panoply of suggested negotiations of this problem. The Department of Industries and Labour acknowledged that the status of the Indian States in the Treaty of Versailles was undefined, although states with colonies, protectorates or possessions which were not selfgoverning were obliged to apply conventions to them, but the Foreign and Political Department had already ruled out consideration of the Indian States as protectorates. During the Versailles negotiations, the Maharaja of Bikaner had insisted that laws in British India in relation to League conventions would not apply to 117 Purcell, Maharajah of Bikaner (note 59), x. 118 Coyajee, India and the League of Nations (note 81), 128. Princely States. Article 405 of the Versailles Treaty had been amended to insist on due regard to 'those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organisations or other special circumstances make the industrial conditions substantially different', but this amendment seemed to have been forgotten, for the time being.
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While analogies were made to provisions in existence for federal states, this suggestion was ruled out by the Legislative Department. Some clarity was provided by Viceroy Reading's opening speech at the session of the Chamber of Princes held in January 1926. 129 This was the same year in which his campaign to reinforce British paramountcy was coming to a head, and marked a stark representational and governmental claim over the quasi-sovereignty of the Princes. He praised the participation of members of the Chamber in League and international assemblies, suggesting that they promote 'reflection to larger lines concerned with the solidarity of the unit of which India is a part and the higher calls of its destiny and humanity at large'. Such participation was also said, however, to entail obligations and responsibilities. The Viceroy emphasised his confidence in the 'co-operation' of the assembled Highnesses in discharging their responsibilities. He continued:
I need not assure you that there is no intention of encroaching unnecessarily on the freedom with which you conduct your internal administrations. At the same time I must ask you to realise that one of the most important results of the creation of the League of Nations has been to bring into existence machinery by which international influence, or rather the joint public opinion of many countries, can be brought to bear on the domestic affairs of all countries and all administrations.
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This suggestion was responded to, however, in a speech by the Maharaja of Patiala in the Chamber of Princes, of which he was the new Chancellor, on 25th November 1926. Whilst not questioning the humanitarian spirit of the international conventions in questions, he insisted that: 'howsoever great the pressure exerted upon the Government of India, by international opinion, for their immediate ratification, there none the less exist obligations, anterior in time and no less sacred in character, which bind the Government of India to respect the autonomy of the Indian States'. As a result of this constitutional dilemma, the decision was reached by the Government of India in 1926 to leave things as they were until there was a practical necessity for action. This necessity arose, however, in the shape of despatch from the Secretary of State for India, issued on 24th March 1927. Keen to avoid the status of the Princely States being investigated by the Permanent Court of International Justice (inaugurated in 1922), the Secretary wished it to be made public that obligations undertaken by the Government of India, in this case the International Labour Convention, could only be applied to British India. Although the central government admitted the flaws in this stance, it was agreed to have no more faults than any alternative solution to India's anomalous position with regard to the League. These geographical anomalies would play out repeatedly as the Government of India attempted to honour its commitments to legal conventions concerning the suppression of trafficking in women and children.
International or internal trafficking?
The sheer scale of India meant that 'international trafficking' was a contentious concept, as women could be moved across greater distances within India and not be internationally trafficked than it would take to move them across multiple nations in Europe. This was at the heart of the controversy of trafficking in India, which led to various governmental enquiries about brothel inhabitants. One of these took place in 1927 following League enquiries regarding the provenance of the women supplied to Bombay's brothels. 131 The It appears to the Government of India that there are obvious objections to such an arrangement as British India and the States form a single geographical unit. There are social and religious factors which make it impossible in present conditions to penalise the procuration of women within this area. Even within the narrower limits of British India it seems impracticable to penalise all procuration. 136 In conclusion, it was stated that if internal trafficking were allowed to continue, it would not be practical to ban it between British and Indian States. As such, on 4th December 1934 the India Office wrote to Eric Ekstrand, head of the Social Questions section of the League, clearly stating that: 'owing to the nature of the relations which exist between British India and Indian States, which under the definition in Article 1 of the Convention would be treated as foreign countries relative to British India, the Government of India does not feel itself in a position to accede to the Convention'. 137 The issue was again raised by a draft convention drawn up during the TWC Committee's session in 1936 that aimed to address the expulsion of procurers. 138 In briefing the Indian delegate, the Home Department insisted that any articles of the convention that addressed international traffic would be of little relevance to India, as there was barely any international trafficking, while internal trafficking was now a matter for provincial governments, most of which had recently legislated against the evil. As such, when Mrs. K. It is India, and not British India, which is a member of the League, and 'India' as defined in the Interpretation Act includes the Indian States. The position of these quasiindependent States in regard to India's representation, and to international obligations that may be undertaken, was at first left undetermined, and. special problems in this connection had to be faced. 142 The British Interpretation Act (1889) defined India as British India plus territories of any native prince or chief under the suzerainty of His Majesty. Suzerainty was here tackled with the rubric of paramountcy 143 : 'The Paramount Power exercises some of the attributes of sovereignty on behalf of the States, and in respect of those attributes His Majesty's Government can bind a State absolutely and by its own authority'. 144 While the state technically could bind the Princes, whether it would do so depended on the subject: for international affairs the British could insist on conformity; for domestic concerns the British would rely on influence and persuasion. While League conventions were meant to be accepted for the whole country, during the internal government debate from 1925 to 1926 article 405 of the Treaty of Versailles had finally been remembered, allowing India to 'contract out' parts of its territory, which was used in future cases between the Princely States and the League more broadly. This power was summarised in the 1930 'Simon Report' on Indian constitution development, which reflected back on domestic developments since the 1919 Government of India Act, but also re-considered India's international situation, providing a series of fascinating insights into the scalar and sovereign complexities of India as an anomalously international part of the British Empire.
Conclusion: anomalies, scales, and sovereignties
The anomaly is evident. On the one hand, as the [British] powers of superintendence, direction and control, vested by the [1919] Act. extend a fortiori to all matters affecting her external relations. The existence of these powers would, therefore, seem to preclude the idea of a separate international status for India. On the other hand, by being placed on an equality with the self-governing Dominions at Versailles and in the League of Nations, India has been treated as it she had attained to the same kind of separate nationhood as that now enjoyed by those Dominions.
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The Simon Report chapter on 'India in the British Empire' comprised submissions by the Government of India (from New Delhi) and the India Office (from London). The latter emphatically pronounced India's difference from the self-governing Dominions, but admitted that India had an exceptional international existence for a state within the British Empire. While the League could in no way effect relations between India and Britain, it was admitted to benefit India in terms of diplomatic experience, public interest in international affairs, and economic and social questions. However, as the quote above demonstrates, while refusing to acknowledge the questions provoked by India's internal anomalies, its external anomaly was returned to again and again. It was unique among 'all the non-Self-Governing States, Dominions or Colonies throughout the world' through its founding member status of the League, and would remain the only such 'striking paradox' as long as the non-self-governing membership exclusions for new entrants remained in the covenant. 146 Under the sub-heading 'Anomalies of the New Status' it was insisted that: 'The new status cannot by any process of reasoning be harmonised with the constitutional relations between India and His Majesty's Government'. 147 As the India Office commented, while the rules of business in the Indian Legislature forbade the discussion of foreign affairs, they had been 'interpreted with sufficient elasticity to allow discussion of many questions actually before the League which affect India'.
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This rhetorical flourish was typical of India Office (London) and Raisina Hill (New Delhi) mandarin rhetoric, but also of a broader imperial negotiation of the elasticity of international law. 149 This was achieved through a policy of, wherever possible, nondefinition. Terms would be left ambiguous and thus open to interpretation, hence the policy was: 'That a formal decision to the effect that either the Secretary of State or the Government in India is the proper authority in Imperial and international questions should be avoided'. 150 A second tactic was to stress how difficult it was to make India's new status a reality, suggesting that the outcome of 1919 discussions in the Versailles Hall of Mirrors had been an unreality, a fantasy. This condensed both the Hegelian view of India as a dream world with E.H. Carr's denunciation of liberal-internationalist dreamers, who set their sights to the stars, not the reality of politics on the ground. 151 The Secretary of State's job, therefore, was to make India's status a reality for practical purposes, within the widest possible limits. The question of India's 'quasi-independence' in external relations was, however, immediately dismissed by the India Office: 'The whole situation, besides being theoretically anomalous, is still too new and experimental to allow of the formulation of any but the most general principles'.
152
What these documents show is that the 'anomaly' of India's international status was recognised and debated at the time, in exactly these terms. The analysis of the scalar dynamics of this anomaly has exposed some of the ways in which the national and the international were interacting in the interwar period. In terms of imperial interactions, India ('inside out') had a degree of selfgovernment and unity at the international level, in the League of Nations, that it did not possess at the national level, in the subcontinent. This was in part a product of governmental exceptionalism, but it was also a product of political philosophical debates about the status of 'India' and of anti-colonial commentaries on India's treatment in the international sphere. In terms of colonial interactions, India ('outside in') was exposed as lacking territorial unity through debates about the quasi-sovereignty of the Princely States, which trafficking in women and children exposed due to its capillary ability to course between the fissures between Princely and British India.
153
Examining the Indian international anomaly through this scalar lens provides a series of insights into a particular sovereignty regime of colonialism. India's external engagement with the League, coordinated through New Delhi, London and Geneva, saw sovereignty being deployed in terms of representation (diplomatic silencing), government (administering exceptionalism), theory (political philosophies of statehood) and politics (anti-colonialism). The internal questions provoked by the League were raised between New Delhi and provincial and regional cities, which saw sovereignty debated in terms of territory (British and Princely India), theory (quasi-sovereignty), government (indirect rule), representation (the Chamber of Princes) and contract (international conventions regarding trafficking). The diversity of these sites and techniques prove that the international was not a sphere with semi-naturalistic processes of government, capital or civilisation. It was a network of sites and names that took in cities and people across the globe, though not on terms of equality, fraternity or liberty. Rather, it produced anomalies in imperial relations and colonial territory that forced novel experiments across the performative range of sovereignty, the traces of which give us, I hope, some tentative and specific answers to the more general question: where was the international? 145 Memoranda, 1632. The first part refers to the 1919 Government of India Act, which devolved some powers to elected Indian Ministers in the provinces but retained British control over India's external relations. 146 
